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STAYBEHIND PROGRAM

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

19 November 1951

**I. Introduction.**

The following commentary on the staybehind program represents primarily a think-piece based on a perusal of the general and specific documents contained in the first two PASTIME folders. It should be remembered that this is just one more contribution to the generally confused staybehind picture, contributed by a person who does not have the background to perceive many of the nuances which would be obvious to the more practiced eye. The main purpose of this document is to raise questions.

**II. Reactions to the Review of Staybehind Activities by [ ]**

a. General. The general impression of this report is that it constitutes a good review of the staybehind program up to the present time. It coordinates the various plans and projects which have emanated from the field and presents a series of very good recommendations drawn up by [ ] concerning future developments of the program.

b. Specific Questions and Reactions.

1. The following statement is made in [ ] report: "KOB believes that this problem (German sponsorship) will become more concrete as German defense participation develops, and suggests as a solution the integration of staybehind agents into whatever German military organization comes into being." This statement brings up the whole question of the relationship between staybehind operations and ZIPPER in the event of actual hostilities in Germany - whether to keep the operations separate, what liaison (if any) should exist, problems of security and compartmentation, etc. There seems to be considerable opinion in Wash. that staybehind operations should be kept completely separated from ZIPPER. Does the field go along with this conception?

2. It is apparent that the staybehind program has developed thus far on a "trial and error" basis, with little overall direction, especially from Washington, and with a rather expedient approach on the part of the field. Questions: How much is expected of Washington in the way of directives? Should there be one individual in FDM in charge of staybehind program? What plans and methods are now known which have been proven effective and worth retaining? Is not more continuity of personnel in the field necessary to the success of the program? Should not more personnel be assigned to the field in view of the importance of the program?

3. "Washington guidance has been conspicuously lacking." This is undoubtedly one of the chief reasons for the confused status of the staybehind program thus far. There are several reasons for the lack of HQ

REASON: *NO SPECIFIC REASON* DATE: *2011*  
 APPROVED: *MR. J. L. DAVIS* REVIEWED: *MR. J. L. DAVIS*  
NEXT REVIEW: *MAY 1952* APPROVAL: *MR. J. L. DAVIS*  
DATE: *27 MAY 1981* REVIEWER: *MR. J. L. DAVIS*

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direction: (1) Lack of personnel; (2) lack of continuity of personnel handling staybehinds; (3) ineffectiveness of the Washington committee having the overall direction of the program. All of these lacks must be overcome before any unified staybehind program can be established and maintained.

4. A number of questions arise concerning the various stay-behind teams in Germany: (1) Liaison (if any) among the various teams; (2) size of teams - prevailing opinion indicates that the teams should be relatively small in size; (3) should some teams be put in touch with other teams at or before the time of activation; and (4) extent, type and advisability of communications between and among teams.

5. The make-up of each team should be much more thoroughly evaluated, both by the field and by Headquarters, along the following lines: (1) Overall direction; (2) communications problems and personnel; (3) number of agents; (4) operational clearance (many of the agents have not been cleared in any way); (5) problem of cut-outs, etc.

6. The exact goal or goals of each team should be established well in advance of activation. Where do they go? What do they do? Commo? Sabotage? Clandestine broadcasts? Espionage? OB reporting? What?

7. The type or types of equipment to be provided each team should be determined in advance of activation. Although lists of equipment have been suggested by the field, considerable technical planning and advice are necessary before this whole problem can be solved. In addition, the type of equipment will vary greatly, presumably, with the goal or goals of each team. When is this equipment to be provided the team? Where cached? Whose responsibility?

8. The problem of finding a suitable method for burial of equipment has not been satisfactorily solved thus far, although the Bureau of Standards is supposed to have discovered a container which is suitable for this purpose. A great deal of time has been wasted in burying various commo sets, etc., only to discover several years later that the equipment has deteriorated and is useless. This is intimately connected with the policy to be followed in making equipment available to the teams. Questions: (1) Is burial the preferred method? (2) Should not considerable equipment be cached in safe houses, barns, outbuildings, etc. (3) Should not equipment, in certain cases, be given to the team or team leader well in advance of activation? (4) At what time, precisely, should either equipment or sealed orders be given to team leaders?

9. There is too much concentration of Kibitz personnel in the Karlsruhe area, leaving the rest of Germany thus far to chance recruitment. Some thought should be given to a country-wide staybehind program. This will, of course, require additional case officer personnel.

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10. The large chain being run by Kibitz 15 is cause for considerable concern, I should think. Here are some 70 agents of one sort or another (some of them former German Army personnel) who have only been cleared in part for operational activity and whose other connections are unknown. The possibilities of blowing part of the staybehind program are great within this outfit alone. At the very least it is too large and, additionally, is being run by a German apparently much on his own. This brings up, also, the question of how much initiative and autonomy should be given the team leader.

11. What are the strategic locations for staybehind activities? How much thought has been given this phase of the program? Kibitz 13, for instance, has written a long dissertation on this subject, recommending three areas; (1) The Alpine region; (2) regions like the Erzgebirge, Harz Mountains, etc; (3) urban areas. Policy should be established on this matter, which thus far appears to have been left to expediency.

12. The training program for commo and other agents is proceeding much too slowly, due doubtless to lack of case officer personnel and lack of time on the part of indigenous personnel. Can this be stepped up? In addition, the field badly needs direction concerning the type of training program needed for staybehind activities.

13. Directions for caching and locating equipment after caching should be given more attention.

14. A definite program for the recruitment of staybehind agents should be established and stepped up. Such agents should be catalogued - as is partially done - according to their staybehind potentials, goals, kinds of equipment needed, locations, etc.

15. What is to be done as far as the CABINDA project is concerned? How much progress has been made: What is the attitude of Headquarters concerning this phase of the program? Is it feasible?

16. A schedule has been set up for the achievement of certain staybehind activities. How well has this schedule been accomplished? Is the schedule reasonable? Too slow? Too fast?

17. The pertinent communications from the field and elsewhere on staybehind operations should be carefully reviewed and integrated. These are: MGB-A-10409, 30 October 51; [redacted] butline, 9 October 51; MGK-A-27934, 29 March 51; Staff Memo, 17 October 50; MGK-W-5906, 9 August 50; Basic Plan CABINDA, 1 August 50; MGB-A-4828, 7 October 49; Staybehind Plan, 2 Sept. 49; and Kapok B-251, 25 August 48.

**III. Recommendations.**

The following general recommendations are listed in the approximate

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order in which they might be put into effect.

1. Headquarters should assure the field that the entire staybehind program is now being seriously reviewed, with the intention of giving the field some relatively final and well-conceived overall plans for the future conduct of the program. Perhaps also, the field should be informed concerning which aspects of the program should be continued or discontinued until definitive word is received from Washington.

2. The field should be asked, in connection with Item (1) above, to forward to Washington a complete report of the present status of stay-behind operations, in detail. This request from Washington should list all items on which the field's recommendations are desired: Number of teams at present, size of teams, locations, burials accomplished and pending, equipment needed or recommended, schedule, pre-activation plans, etc., etc. Washington can hardly proceed intelligently until all problems faced by the field are known in detail.

3. The specific items mentioned under Part II, above, should then be taken up and carefully studied before answers can be given. For this purpose the re-activation of the Staybehind Committee becomes necessary.



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